Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: An empirical examination in complex work settings [electronic resource]
說明
77 p
附註
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: 4022
Advisers: Ranjani Krishnan; Karen Sedatole
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University, 2008
This study examines the question: What factors determine whether supervisors subjectively adjust the objective performance measures of managers? I use survey and proprietary secondary data of 434 objective performance measures for 111 audit managers from 12 divisions of one of the world's largest internal audit organizations to study this question. The organization introduced a pay-for-performance incentive plan that allowed supervisors to adjust (up or down) the objective performance measures of audit managers. Empirical evidence documents both benefits and costs of subjectivity. Specifically, supervisors subjectively adjusted objective performance measures they perceived to be incomplete, unverifiable, and noisy, suggesting incentive contracting benefits. However, objective performance measures were also subjectively adjusted based on influence activities of managers and personal preferences of supervisors, suggesting incentive contracting costs
