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001 AAI28413963
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008 211129s2021 xx sbm 000 0 eng d
020 9798516063756
035 (MiAaPQ)AAI28413963
040 MiAaPQ|beng|cMiAaPQ|dNTU
100 1 Sinander, Carl Martin Ludvig
245 10 Essays in Economic Theory
264 0 |c2021
300 1 online resource (284 pages)
336 text|btxt|2rdacontent
337 computer|bc|2rdamedia
338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
500 Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-
01, Section: B
500 Advisor: Dekel, Eddie
502 Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2021
504 Includes bibliographical references
520 This dissertation comprises three essays in distinct areas
of economic theory.The first chapter is co-authored with
Gregorio Curello. We identify a new and pervasive dynamic
agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt
disclosure of productive information. To study it, we
introduce a model in which a technological breakthrough
occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by
an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via
her control of the agent's utility. We uncover a striking
deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a
simple deadline form in an important special case, and a
graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our
results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.In
the second chapter, I prove an envelope theorem with a
converse: the envelope formula is equivalent to a first-
order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope
theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice
set. I use the converse envelope theorem to extend to
abstract outcomes the canonical result in mechanism design
that any increasing allocation is implementable, and apply
this to selling information.The final chapter, also co-
authored with Gregorio Curello, concerns collective
decision-making. A committee ranks a set of alternatives
by sequentially voting on pairs, in an order chosen by the
committee's chair. Although the chair has no knowledge of
voters' preferences, we show that she can do as well as if
she had perfect information. We characterise strategies
with this 'regret-freeness' property in two ways: (1) they
are efficient, and (2) they avoid two intuitive errors.
One regret-free strategy is a sorting algorithm called
insertion sort. We show that it is characterised by a
lexicographic property, and is outcome-equivalent to a
recursive variant of the much-studied amendment procedure
533 Electronic reproduction.|bAnn Arbor, Mich. :|cProQuest,
|d2021
538 Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 Systems science
653 Collective decision making
653 Dynamic agency
653 Incentives
653 Envelope theorem
653 First order condition
653 Disclosure of productive information
655 7 Electronic books.|2local
690 0511
690 0501
690 0790
710 2 ProQuest Information and Learning Co
710 2 Northwestern University.|bEconomics
773 0 |tDissertations Abstracts International|g83-01B
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/
advanced?query=28413963|zclick for full text (PQDT)
912 圖書館PQDT110|b1110406
