MARC 主機 00000nam 2200000 4500
001 AAI9907815
005 20061006142511.5
008 061006s1998 s eng d
020 0599056487
035 (UnM)AAI9907815
040 UnM|cUnM
100 1 Spreeuw, Darren Louis
245 10 New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence
from Bulgarian cooperatives|h[electronic resource]
300 175 p
500 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-
09, Section: A, page: 3587
500 Chair: Mieke Meurs
502 Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 1998
520 With the collapse of the state socialist regimes of
Eastern Europe, agricultural production cooperatives have
emerged and flourished despite the theoretical problems of
such organizational forms, mainly incentive problems that
induce workers to shirk--to "free-ride." This dissertation
utilizes adapted models of collective action to explain
how cooperatives have overcome problems of free-riding
with regard to labor effort provision
520 In the first essay, the model shows how villagers facing
this collective action problem may utilize peer-monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms to create incentives within the
cooperative that control free-riding. These institutions
allow cooperative members to gather important information
regarding the work efforts of fellow members, and such
information affects the strategies and actions available
within the game theoretic model. Further, peer monitoring
and enforcement are facilitated by high levels of social
cohesion--equality, a shared history of collective action,
and repeated interactions within dense social networks. By
modeling these institutions into a game that takes place
over time, players have access to information from
previous periods, and can formulate conditional strategies
--"I will cooperate if you cooperate." Within the model,
the game structure need not be that of the "prisoner's
dilemma," as presented by past models of collective
action. The model is empirically tested by case study data
collected during a nine month Fulbright Fellowship in
Bulgaria
520 In the second essay, altruistic preferences are added to
the model, which shows how villagers facing this
collective action problem may be able to draw on shared
group affiliations to limit free riding. The model
hypothesizes that in villages where equality and a shared
history have created a cohesive community, the preferences
of an individual cooperative member may be affected by the
welfare of other members. With altruism included into
member utility functions, members may have incentives to
provide higher levels of labor effort to the cooperative.
Altruistic preferences, promoted in a cohesive community,
can change the theoretical game from a prisoner's dilemma
to a game where cooperation is more probable
520 The third essay is a historical study of the state's
support for the institutional transplant of Raiffeisen
credit cooperatives in Bulgaria
590 School code: 0008
650 4 Economics, Theory
650 4 Economics, General
650 4 Economics, Labor
690 0511
690 0501
690 0510
710 20 The American University
773 0 |tDissertation Abstracts International|g59-09A
856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/
advanced?query=9907815
912 PQDT
