MARC 主機 00000nam 2200000 4500 001 AAI9907815 005 20061006142511.5 008 061006s1998 s eng d 020 0599056487 035 (UnM)AAI9907815 040 UnM|cUnM 100 1 Spreeuw, Darren Louis 245 10 New institutionalist essays on collective action: Evidence from Bulgarian cooperatives|h[electronic resource] 300 175 p 500 Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59- 09, Section: A, page: 3587 500 Chair: Mieke Meurs 502 Thesis (Ph.D.)--The American University, 1998 520 With the collapse of the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, agricultural production cooperatives have emerged and flourished despite the theoretical problems of such organizational forms, mainly incentive problems that induce workers to shirk--to "free-ride." This dissertation utilizes adapted models of collective action to explain how cooperatives have overcome problems of free-riding with regard to labor effort provision 520 In the first essay, the model shows how villagers facing this collective action problem may utilize peer-monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to create incentives within the cooperative that control free-riding. These institutions allow cooperative members to gather important information regarding the work efforts of fellow members, and such information affects the strategies and actions available within the game theoretic model. Further, peer monitoring and enforcement are facilitated by high levels of social cohesion--equality, a shared history of collective action, and repeated interactions within dense social networks. By modeling these institutions into a game that takes place over time, players have access to information from previous periods, and can formulate conditional strategies --"I will cooperate if you cooperate." Within the model, the game structure need not be that of the "prisoner's dilemma," as presented by past models of collective action. The model is empirically tested by case study data collected during a nine month Fulbright Fellowship in Bulgaria 520 In the second essay, altruistic preferences are added to the model, which shows how villagers facing this collective action problem may be able to draw on shared group affiliations to limit free riding. The model hypothesizes that in villages where equality and a shared history have created a cohesive community, the preferences of an individual cooperative member may be affected by the welfare of other members. With altruism included into member utility functions, members may have incentives to provide higher levels of labor effort to the cooperative. Altruistic preferences, promoted in a cohesive community, can change the theoretical game from a prisoner's dilemma to a game where cooperation is more probable 520 The third essay is a historical study of the state's support for the institutional transplant of Raiffeisen credit cooperatives in Bulgaria 590 School code: 0008 650 4 Economics, Theory 650 4 Economics, General 650 4 Economics, Labor 690 0511 690 0501 690 0510 710 20 The American University 773 0 |tDissertation Abstracts International|g59-09A 856 40 |uhttp://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/ advanced?query=9907815 912 PQDT
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