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001 978-3-031-27601-9
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020 9783031276019|q(electronic bk.)
020 9783031276002|q(paper)
024 7 10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9|2doi
040 GP|cGP|erda
041 0 eng
050 4 QA269
072 7 TBJ|2bicssc
072 7 TEC009000|2bisacsh
072 7 TBJ|2thema
082 04 519.3|223
100 1 Weiss, Uri,|eauthor
245 10 Games to play and games not to play :|bstrategic decisions
via extensions of game theory /|cby Uri Weiss, Joseph
Agassi
264 1 Cham :|bSpringer Nature Switzerland :|bImprint: Springer,
|c2023
300 1 online resource (xi, 236 pages) :|billustrations (some
color), digital ;|c24 cm
336 text|btxt|2rdacontent
337 computer|bc|2rdamedia
338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
347 text file|bPDF|2rda
490 1 Studies in systems, decision and control,|x2198-4190 ;
|vvolume 469
505 0 Introduction: Game Theory and Peace -- Strategic Decisions
: Game and Strategy: Extended Game Theory -- Game Theory
Encourages Peace -- International Accords -- Game Theory
as Part-and-parcel of Social Science -- The Game Theory of
the European Union versus the Pax Romana -- Playing the
Game of International Law -- Mutual Threat: The Game of
the Cold War -- Equilibria in Games of War and Peace:
Options for Cooperation -- The Game not Chosen: Equilibria
of Games about Games
520 This book contributes to the theatrical discussions of
equilibria that rest on error-in which we include mistaken
choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends
diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given
games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no
player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The
literature also refers to the design of games that fit
given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its
function is to serve social planners ignorant of the
preferences of the people intended to play them. Our study
of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of
choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing,
and that both players and planners can generate. This
comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims
to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that
aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on
the question, considering the public interest, what set of
games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is
advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such
as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of
games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more
applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game
to play is less practical than choosing what game not to
play. This invites legislation and similar incentives;
their study should aim at the improvement of their
usefulness. Discussing the possibility of changing both
game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of
social science. For this mathematical models will not do:
it requires a clear distinction between describing options
and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance
efforts at improvement
650 0 Game theory
650 0 Decision making
650 14 Mathematical and Computational Engineering Applications
650 24 Game Theory
650 24 Operations Research and Decision Theory
700 1 Agassi, Joseph,|eauthor
710 2 SpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 |tSpringer Nature eBook
830 0 Studies in systems, decision and control ;|vvolume 469
856 40 |uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9
912 Springer |b111206084615
